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Abstract - The primary aim of this study is to further our understanding of the measures taken to contain epidemics in 
Portugal during the nineteenth century. The first cordons sanitaires along the country’s land border were organized in 1800 
and 1804 to prevent the spread of plague and yellow fever from Spain. Later, as also happened in countries with better public 
health regulations, liberal governments in Portugal did not shy away from implementing the quarantine procedures they had 
inherited from previous absolutist governments. This is clearly seen in the establishment of probably the last land-based 
cordon sanitaire to protect the country, which was set up in 1885 to guard against the cholera that was devastating Spain. 
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I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF EPIDEMIC       
CONTROL IN PORTUGAL 
 
Ever since bubonic plague had invaded the continent 
in the mid-14th century, European governments had 
devoted a significant part of their activities to disease 
control, which involved a variety of sectors and 
interest groups and even international policy making. 
By the early 15th century, Portugal, like many other 
political entities, was using the methods developed by 
the Italian cities to fight the plague, although a 
permanent agency to tackle the problem was only set 
up a century later, and even then only in Lisbon. 
Portugal’s geographic position left the country 
dangerously exposed to the effects of maritime trade, 
and this was especially true in Lisbon, the capital and 
largest port. Indeed, it was in the Lisbon area that the 
Crown began to organize its sanitary defense of the 
coastline by building major quarantine and ship 
inspection facilities at Trafaria, on the opposite shore 
of the Tagus estuary [1]. The Trafaria lazaretto 
remained the sole quarantine center for passengers, 
crews and cargoes until 1816, when it moved a few 
kilometers south to Caparica. Vessels authorized to 
approach the city would cross the Tagus and dock at 
Belém. Both facilities—Trafaria and Belém—had 
their own bodies of public servants managed by the 
chief health officer (Provedor-mor da Saúde), who in 
turn answered to the king. 
A sporadic military (army and navy) presence in 
Trafaria and the port of Lisbon during the second half 
of the 18th century became permanent in 1815, when a 
warship and a detachment of troops with fire power 
were stationed there to control the sanitary inspection 
and quarantine facilities that protected Lisbon [2]. In 
July 1824, for example, there were 104 soldiers in the 
Trafaria–Belém area “employed [...] in the assistance 
of public health” [3]. 
The coastal protection system was strengthened and 
modernized on several occasions in the 19th century, 
particularly in the 1874 and 1889 reforms. The aim 
was always to introduce the latest European practices, 
yet, with the exception of the Regulation of March 8, 
1860 (replaced in 1868), which attempted to relax 
traditional quarantine measures in line with the 
proposals of the 1851 and 1859 International Sanitary 
Conferences, the prevailing attitude was to keep the 
maritime border under strict inspection and 
control[4].  
Despite its known weaknesses, which have been 
abundantly documented, this maritime protection and 
control system functioned as a permanent coastal 
cordon sanitaire, attracting complaints from 
diplomats accredited in Portugal, who often 
interpreted it as a commercial weapon against the 
countries they represented. 
 
The territorial defense arrangements on land were 
different. Here, the Crown merely imposed temporary 
measures at times when the country was threatened or 
affected by disease outbreaks [5]. The fact that the 
municipalities were unable to take action themselves 
without first seeking royal approval meant that the 
people were vulnerable to fluctuations in the central 
government’s authority and ability to intervene: the 
stronger the government, the more protection they 
enjoyed, but when it was weak (as it often was) they 
were abandoned to their fate. In cities, the walls 
functioned as a stone cordon sanitaire, guarded by 
armed men who controlled who and what could come 
in and go out according to central government orders 
or, not uncommonly, their own convenience. Outside 
of the cities, there is hardly any documentary evidence 
to work with, apart from a few suggestions that there 
were cordons sanitaires in disease-affected areas that 
were manned by local militias (ordenanças), 
territorially based paramilitary units under municipal 
control in which all able-bodied men aged between 15 
and 60 had to enlist. 
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II. THE FIRST BORDER CORDONS 
SANITAIRES 
 
The first cordons sanitaires along Portugal’s land 
border with Spain for which we have documentary 
evidence were established during the yellow fever 
outbreak in Cádiz in 1800 and the plague and yellow 
fever outbreaks in Málaga and Vigo in 1804 [6]. The 
political situation in Portugal at the turn of the century 
was tense, since Napoleon Bonaparte’s return to 
France had rekindled apprehensions about the 
Continental Blockade. The available data and the 
geography of the 1800 cordon suggest that the 
government made use of the fear that the epidemic 
might spread from Spain to mobilize the militias in 
the south of the country, where men often fled to 
escape military recruitment. If the outbreak continued 
to be confined to Cádiz, on Spain’s southern coast, 
why was there greater investment on the land border 
than on the coast of the Algarve? And why did the 
land-based cordon extend north to the Tagus but leave 
a long gap between the Tagus and Douro, with a 
further concentration of troops in Trás-os-Montes 
(Fig. 1)? The answer may be found on the Spanish side 
of the border, where in 1800 the preparations for war 
were under way, with troops, field hospitals and 
supply depots already in Galicia, Extremadura and 
Andalusia. It seems likely, therefore, that once 
“civilians” had joined the militias to serve in the 
cordon, they might then be forcibly recruited into the 
regular army for the imminent war with Spain. The 
outcome of that war was defeat for Portugal, but 
yellow fever did not cross the border. 
In contrast, the 1804 cordon stretched along the whole 
land border from the southern coast almost as far as 
the Douro. It was composed primarily of regular 
troops and its sole purpose was to protect public 
health. The authorities had probably learned how to 
set up a military cordon sanitaire from the Prussian 
generals that were reorganizing the Portuguese army 
at the time, since it was established according to the 
prevailing international rules (Fig. 2). 
In Alentejo, in the south, it comprised three almost 
parallel lines of defense. Regular troops formed the 
f i r s t ; 
 
Fig. 1: Cordon sanitaire, 1800. From [6], p. 240. 
 
Fig. 2: Cordon sanitaire, 1804. From [6], p. 246. 
 
they also surrounded villages in the border zone, 
blocked highways, and closed the almost 200 small 
ports. Behind them, the second line was composed of 
lazarettos, and the third of civilian and military 
hospitals (Fig. 3). 
Whether it was because the epidemics were waning as 
they approached Portugal or because the army’s 
measures were  
 
 
Fig. 3: Cordon sanitaire in Alentejo, 1804. From [6], p.248. 
 
effective, the fact is that once again the country 
escaped unharmed from the threat of disease, unlike 
Málaga, where yellow fever killed 36% of the 
population. 
In 1804 (and perhaps also in 1800), the absolutist 
state had been unable to develop internal public health 
structures and, therefore, closed the land border to 
protect the people and country from the scourges that 
were devastating its neighbor. Later, in different 
political times, when liberal governments in Portugal 
were faced with disease outbreaks, they rarely 
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hesitated at the choice between upholding either the 
right to life or the right to individual freedom [7]. 
Ongoing research shows that cordons sanitaires 
remained the standard response to epidemics until the 
end of the 19th century, despite the new ideological 
and regulatory framework. 
At the International Sanitary Conferences, the 
European powers called for quarantine measures to be 
harmonized across the continent and also to be made 
time-limited, not least to serve their own commercial 
and imperialistic interests [8]. Portugal always 
aligned itself with the other southern European 
countries, which upheld the right of peoples to choose 
the procedures most suited to their own situations; in 
other words, to vary the strictness of quarantine 
according to their geographic locations, their 
economic capabilities, and the development of their 
public health facilities. Portuguese governments were 
well aware of their country’s weaknesses and did not 
dare to take risks. One of the cases that best illustrates 
this position is that of the 1885 cordon, which was 
probably the last cordon sanitaire to be established at a 
national scale in Portugal.1 
 
III. CLOSING THE BORDER TO CHOLERA: 
THE 1885 CORDON SANITAIRE 
 
In late May 1885, as soon as the Portuguese 
Government learned that cholera had been identified 
in Valencia province, eastern Spain, it closed all 
railroad traffic between the two countries until the 
border lazarettos could be opened. The recently 
expanded railroad network emerged as the focus of all 
fears. It became the main target for the government’s 
quarantine measures, which regulated the tiniest 
details of where trains from Spain would stop and 
what formalities would be required for passengers, 
baggage, and mail. The process was carried through 
by two military physicians who had reorganized the 
lazarettos for the last cordon sanitaire set up the 
previous year, when it was realized that they no longer 
had the capacity for large numbers of railroad 
passengers. The 1884 cordon had been a shambles at 
first, due to erratic and flawed decision making, until 
the government passed control of operations on the 
ground to the War Ministry, under the overall 
supervision of the Interior Ministry. It ended up being 
a training exercise for the government and for all the 
agencies involved in it, and the lessons learned were 
applied successfully the following year. 
 
At the beginning of June 1885, the Interior Ministry 
called on the War Ministry to organize the cordon 
along the border, while it took care of internal defense 
itself in conjunction with the civil governors, the 
government’s representatives in the provinces. The 
 
1 The information that follows was compiled from sources [9]–[12]. 
countless measures adopted included an immediate 
halt to any economic activity involving cross-border 
contact with persons or goods (e.g. fishing in shared 
rivers, holding fairs, or exchanging labor), the 
erection of temporary telegraph stations at the border, 
the preparation of cholera hospitals, the organization 
of district and municipal health committees, and the 
recruitment of physicians and surgeons for locations 
where there was a shortage. 
 
In early July, people needed a health card to buy 
railroad tickets to inland destinations, a measure that 
the Interior Ministry described as “a second line of 
defense.” By then there were 538 cavalry and almost 
4,500 infantry stationed along the land border (and 
more than 6,500 by January 1886), almost one-fifth of 
the entire army including reservists. This capability 
was supplemented by that of the customs posts, with 
their experience in pursuing smugglers. Army 
physicians and surgeons were banned from taking 
leave save in exceptional circumstances. 
 
As the outbreak in Spain declined, in late November 
the quarantine periods in Portugal began to be reduced 
and, on January 12, 1886, the controls for passengers 
coming from Madrid and France were cut to 24 hours 
under observation. Gradually, people were allowed to 
resume their former activities, although with a 
number of restrictions and about-turns, but it was 
April before the quarantine system was fully 
dismantled. 
 
The hundreds of documents that describe the 
preparation and operation of this cordon sanitaire 
paint a picture of a country mobilized against a 
common enemy, but they also give a disturbing insight 
into the conditions that soldiers had to endure as 
human shields against the advance of cholera, and the 
everyday poverty and destitution of communities that 
lacked the basic necessities of life. It should be noted 
that the cordon was being prepared almost at the same 
time as the International Sanitary Conference in Rome 
in May–June 1885. Like all the others, this conference 
was mostly concerned with maritime trade and, 
consequently, with the hindrance to trade caused by 
quarantine measures. The Portuguese Government 
kept its maritime quarantine procedures virtually 
unchanged and focused instead on land-based 
measures. The recent expansion of the railroad 
network, in the government’s view, greatly increased 
the risk of spreading cholera. Indifferent to the debate 
between contagionists and anticontagionists, 
international recommendations, and internal 
criticism, it took only a few days to implement a 
territorial sanitary system based around the railroad 
links with Spain and internal branch lines, which also 
determined the location of lazarettos, vigilance 
centers and cholera hospitals. Troops were deployed 
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according to geographic requirements, with particular 
attention to the entry routes provided by the Minho 
and Guadiana rivers (Fig. 4). 
We cannot be sure that it was the land-based cordon 
sanitaire that protected Portugal from the 1885 
cholera  
 
Fig. 4: Cordon sanitaire, July 1885. Compiled from [9]–[12]. 
 
epidemic, which killed some 120,000 people in Spain, 
but we should not underestimate its effect in terms of 
suppressing travel and the movement of agents that 




Resorting to the traditional measures of quarantine 
and cordons sanitaires to tackle the threat of epidemics 
in the 19th century was not a Portuguese 
idiosyncrasy. 2  Perhaps the factor that bore most 
weight in this policy was that they had always been the 
country’s main means of defense. That is not to 
support Ackerknecht’s thesis [13] that traditional 
quarantine policies were chosen by more conservative 
regimes. Even though Portugal’s governments might 
have been aware of the scientific arguments against 
quarantine in favor of the “English system” of 
reducing such measures [14], it was still necessary to 
set up effective disease prevention and control bodies 
[15]. Not only was there no money to do so, but the 
 
2 For the case of Majorca, one of many that could be cited, see [7]. 
unstable political system made it difficult to establish a 
model for the organization of the country. 
Nonetheless, epidemics triggered national 
emergencies and it was one of the primary duties of the 
state to maintain the country’s territorial integrity 
[16]. Closing the borders was the only viable solution. 
It should also be noted that at that time the army was 
the most highly organized institution of the state and 
the one with the greatest capacity for mobilization. In 
addition, although the costs of these measures were 
high, they were short-term costs, and the potential 
financial losses resulting from the slowdown in 
economic activity were less of a risk than the 
possibility of losing population, in a country with a 
structural shortage of people. In this respect, the 
cordons sanitaires were also a populationist measure. 
When the cordons were removed, either because the 
danger had passed or at times of political turmoil, the 
land and people were to a great extent abandoned to 
their fate, exposed to both disease outbreaks and the 
endemic conditions that silently proved more lethal 
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